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Ontario should introduce a pricing scheme that fully links the consumer price
to peak-period generation costs, environmental costs and the high cost of new
generation, reducing both financial and electrical stress on the system.
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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATIONElectricity pricing has created political problems for many Canadian provinces. Most
provinces have relied on flat rates and price-freezes for electricity that may be politically
expedient in the near term but have led to over-consumption, pollution, fiscal stress and
excess pressures on the generation system. 
This Backgrounder argues that Ontario should implement a pricing scheme that encourages
conservation by consumers, reduces strain on the generation system, and covers the cost of
operation. Such a pricing plan would equate the hourly cost of electricity generation,
including the environmental cost, with what consumers pay, known as real-time pricing.
Ontario is moving in this direction, but should go further by fully linking the cost of
operation in periods of high strain on the generation system with the price paid by
consumers. 
One of the major hurdles to implementing time-of-use pricing is measuring individual
customer use in multi-unit residential buildings. This can be addressed, however, with
regulations that guide condo owners and rental landlords toward decisions that reap the
economic benefits, when justified, of installing smart meters. 
Ontario has historically been a battleground of competing principles of electricity pricing
that at varying times have stressed consumer protection, economic efficiency, environmental
goals, fairness amongst consumers, subsidies to favoured industries and revenue collection,
amongst other goals. How Ontario balances these competing priorities will be an important
determinant of the performance of its electrical system. Other Canadian provinces with
similar price programs can learn from the examples Ontario has – and can – set.
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E
lectricity pricing has created
political problems for many
Canadian provincial governments.
This is especially true in the province
of Ontario, where governments have
vacillated between different consumer
electricity-pricing models, motivated
at times by principles and at other
times by political expedience.
Prices affect behaviour and the price of electricity (apart
from transmission and distribution) should be set with
that behaviour in mind, not just to satisfy short-term
political demands. Despite recent increases, the price
level in Ontario is still too low, leaving the province ill-
prepared to meet the rising cost of supplies from new
facilities that will be required in coming years. This
Backgrounder endorses introducing time-varying pricing
for all small consumers and recommends increasing
prices to reflect environmental costs and expensive new
generation. Policies for the provision of consumer
information and appliance controls should complement
these pricing changes. 
A pricing system that equates consumer costs with
the actual cost of production would encourage
consumers to conserve electricity at all times – especially
peak times – reduce the strain on the generation and
transmission systems and reduce the fiscal cost of the
electricity system. All of these gains follow from
applying the principle of economically efficient pricing.
Electricity Pricing in Ontario and the Rest
of Canada
The long-standing principle that Ontario prices
must cover costs was abandoned when consumer
complaints about price increases in the early 1990s
led the government to limit wholesale prices in
1993. After the province opened a competitive
market in May 2002, consumer complaints about a
tripling of average monthly prices from May to
September led the government to cap prices at 4.3
cents/kWh in November 2002, crippling the
market (Dewees, 2009). 
Just as important as price levels, however, is the
structure of prices. Today, the standard pricing for
small and medium consumers of electricity in
Ontario, who represent 40 percent of total
consumption, is the Regulated Price Plan (RPP)
which has a mildly increasing block rate – the first
600 kWh/month (summer) cost 5.7 cents per kWh
and the remainder cost 6.6 cents (Table 1). In May
2009, Ontario’s Minister of Energy and
Infrastructure at the time, George Smitherman,
announced that within two years 3.6 million
Ontario customers would be on Time-of-Use
(TOU) pricing with low prices at night and higher
prices during mid-peak and peak weekday times
(Ontario, MEI, 2009). The rollout of smart meters
across the province will facilitate more TOU pricing
and more sophisticated real-time pricing where the
price can vary every hour or less. 
Cities in British Columbia, Manitoba and
Quebec also have increasing block prices. New
Brunswick and PEI have declining block prices: the
first block of electricity carries a relatively high price
per kWh, while usage beyond this block brings a
lower price. This structure was intended to cover the
fixed costs of serving each customer and to
encourage electricity consumption. Saskatchewan,
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador have
flat prices. Alberta’s Regulated Rate Option varies
monthly with market prices (Table 2). 
Principles
Most electricity systems and regulators try to balance
multiple pricing goals or principles including: economic
efficiency, revenue adequacy, fairness, transparency,
demands for special treatment and political
acceptability. Economically efficient pricing means
pricing that maximizes the welfare of all Canadians,
both consumers and producers, with many of the latter
being government-owned. Efficient pricing requires
that the marginal price of electricity equal the marginal
cost of generation. Efficient prices communicate to
consumers the costs that their incremental
consumption causes and to producers the value of their
output. The marginal price is the price of the last kWh
of power that the consumer chooses to consume. The
Independent • Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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Table 1:  Ontario Residential Pricing: Summer 2009, RPP and TOU plus CPP Example
Sources: Dewees (2009); various sources. 
Price Plan Hours Price
(¢/kWh)
Comment






Off-peak Weekdays: 10 p.m.-7 a.m.,
weekends: all day
4.2
Mid-peak Weekdays: 7 a.m. to 11 a.m.,
5 p.m. to 10 p.m.
7.6
Peak Weekdays: 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. 9.1
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) Time-of-Use prices, except:
CPP on up to 9 selected days:
2 p.m. to 8 p.m.
30 Hypothetical example. Off-
peak price would be reduced
to compensate.
Location  Fixed Charges Low Rate High Rate Threshold Comment
(dollars) (¢/kWh) (¢/kWh) (kWh/month)
Vancouver BC 3.84  5.91 8.27 1350
Calgary AB 15.65  10.01 RROc
Medicine Hat AB 6.65  11.53 RRO
Edmonton AB 17.93  8.07 RRO
Regina SK 15.31  9.38 9.38
Saskatoon SK 15.31  9.38 9.38
Winnipeg MB 6.85  6.25 6.30 900
Englehart ON 20.78  5.60 6.50 1000 Wa, 600 Sb RPPd
Kenora ON 14.78  5.60 6.50 1000 W, 600 S RPP
Toronto ON 17.75  5.60 6.50 1000 W, 600 S RPP
Montreal QC 12.36  5.40 7.33 30 (per day)
Moncton NB 19.73  9.69 9.22 1300
Saint John NB 19.73  9.69 9.22 1300
Halifax NS 10.83  11.80 11.80
Charlottetown PE 24.57  11.78 9.14 2000
St. John's NL 15.56  9.63 9.63
Table 2:  Selected Canadian Residential Electricity Rates
Notes: a Winter. b Summer.
c Regulated Rate Option (Alberta):  The monthly price is a blend of the spot price and long-term prices.  The spot price proportion is 80 percent in
July 2009 and will be 100 percent in July 2010.
d Regulated Price Plan (Ontario).
Sources: National Energy Board (2009), Manitoba Hydro (2009), BC Hydro (2009).Backgrounder 124 | 3
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marginal cost is the cost of generating that last kWh of
power. In the middle of the night when only baseload
units are running, the short-run marginal cost may be
only a few cents per kWh. On a hot summer afternoon
when peaking plants are running, the short-run
marginal cost may be 10 cents or more per kWh. 
Marginal cost pricing is efficient because consumers
respond to price by using less power if prices are high
and more if prices are low. If marginal generation costs
10 cents/kWh and customers only pay 5 cents, they
will use some power that is worth less to them than the
cost of production. Why would we produce something
at a cost of 10 cents when the customer only values it at
5 cents? We make ourselves worse off. On the other
hand, if the price is 10 cents and off-peak generation
costs 5 cents or less, consumers will fail to use some
power that is worth more to them than the cost of
production. Setting price equal to marginal cost gives
both consumers and producers the right incentive.
This marginal cost is not just the operating cost of
generation; it should include the value of any pollution
damage caused by the marginal generation unit(s). The
cost of generation for a fossil-fuelled unit discharging
air pollutants and carbon dioxide should include the
harm from that discharge. This harm could be valued
at 1 cent to 10 cents/kWh depending on the type of
fossil generation and our value of CO2(Dewees,
2008). Including pollution damage in the price of
electricity will discourage generation from polluting
sources and discourage consumption that requires dirty
generation. It will also indicate how much we should
spend for electricity from non-polluting sources. We do
not fully include pollution damage in electricity prices
today because Ontario does not rely primarily on cap-
and-trade emission allowances or pollution taxes to
control fossil emissions.
1Electricity prices would
increase if Ontario adopted those policies on a more
comprehensive basis and continued to burn fossil fuels.
Efficient pricing also requires that customers face the
long-run marginal cost of production; that is, the cost
of power from new plants that are required to meet
today’s demands. While the economic downturn that
began in 2008 has substantially reduced electricity
demand, that demand will likely rebound with the
economic recovery. Moreover, aging nuclear plants will
soon require refurbishment or replacement, so even
without substantial demand growth we will need
substantial investment in generation. This is important
since new generation in Ontario, whether powered by
natural gas, wind, solar or nuclear, is much more
expensive than the low-cost power from our massive
hydro-electric facilities.
2Peak-period electricity prices
must increase to pay for new peak capacity and all
electricity prices must increase to pay for new baseload
capacity. 
A second pricing principle is that revenues collected
must, on average, cover all system costs. This is the
central goal of traditional rate regulation and is no less
important in a mixed competitive system. Ontario
violates this principle whenever system costs exceed
revenue, thus increasing the debt or tax burden
associated with the system.
A third principle is fairness among customers. To the
extent possible, customers should pay for the costs that
they impose on the system. We should avoid
compelling one set of customers to pay for the
consumption of others. Off-peak consumers should
not have to pay for peak-period capacity and
generation.
A fourth pricing principle is simplicity and
transparency. Consumers should be able to understand
their electricity bill and how changing their
consumption would affect that bill. Most consumers
do not want to think much about their electricity use
or to track real-time prices. Most do not know how
much they consume at any time and thus cannot
compare fixed-price plans with time-varying pricing.
Some, however, are willing to give up control over
some appliances, as evidenced by the modest success of
plans, such as Toronto Hydro’s Peaksaver program, that
give a discount in exchange for utility control over the
operating times of hot-water heaters and air
conditioning. 
1 Ontario has an emission reduction trading system for controlling nitrogen oxides and sulphur dioxide but not greenhouse gases. Coal emissions are
being reduced by directives to close coal-fired power plants, not by emission caps.
2 The Ontario Power Authority (2007) estimates the “levelized” cost of new gas generation at 7 cents to 10 cents/kWh and nuclear at a low 6 cents
that seems to ignore the history of cost over-runs and delays associated with nuclear power. Moody’s Investor Services (2008, p. 15) expects nuclear
power to cost over 15 cents/kWh (US) when it comes on line late in the next decade. Hydropower from Quebec or Labrador will cost at least the
average export price of 9 cents (OCAA, 2009, p. 9).| 4 Backgrounder 124
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Finally, electricity pricing should achieve some
degree of customer satisfaction. Unhappy customers
may demand government intervention that is
unpredictable. Electricity pricing exists within a
political system and can be influenced by pressure on
that system as we saw in 1993 and 2002. Ontario is
more vulnerable than most US states to political
interference because so much of the system is owned
by crown or municipal corporations rather than by
investors as in the US. The increasing block rates used
in several provinces have the advantage of imposing
higher prices at the margin but reducing the
consumer’s bill with the low initial rate. This reduces
customer resistance to the higher marginal rate. TOU
rates may also incorporate increasing block rates within
each time period to offset the effect on consumers of
high marginal cost with bills that are not too high.
These principles do not all lead to the same results, so
some balancing is necessary to implement them.
Practice
Ontario’s current electricity pricing system for small
consumers compares poorly against the efficiency goal.
Most small consumers are on the Regulated Price Plan
with no time variation in price to reflect the widely
time-varying marginal cost of generation.
3Constant
prices do not communicate to consumers the costs that
their consumption causes. “Smart” meters record
consumption every hour or less of the day so the price
could change hourly or more frequently. As smart
meters are installed, some local distribution utilities are
offering TOU pricing with peak, mid-peak and off-
peak prices (Table 1) but the current penetration, while
growing, is still small and TOU pricing is a weak
approximation of the actual minute-by-minute
marginal cost. Also, the electricity price does not
include environmental externalities that might increase
the wholesale price substantially, perhaps doubling it at
times (RWDI, 2005). Ontario does not attract new
generation by relying on the wholesale market price or
a “capacity market” that pays a bonus to generators that
are needed especially for peak periods. Instead, the
Ontario Power Authority (OPA), which is responsible
for ensuring adequate long-term supply of electricity,
contracts for new power and the price of that power is
averaged with the low price of existing facilities. The
resulting average price is not nearly as high as the cost
per kWh of many new facilities being planned or built. 
Ontario’s pursuit of the other principles is mixed.
The increase in average price for small consumers from
4.3 cents in 2002 to around the 6-cent level today
moves toward a price that covers system costs, although
the price still does not reflect all costs. Fairness and
efficiency are poor because small customers, whose use
of electricity is high during peak periods when supply is
expensive, pay the same price as those whose use is con-
centrated in off-peak periods. The latter are compelled to
subsidise the former. This inequity will be reduced by
the spread of TOU pricing and by the implementation
of new pricing guidelines that allocate more new
capacity costs to the peak period (OEB, 2009a, p. 28).
Transparency is good because the pricing is simple.
Consumer satisfaction seems good despite inevitable
calls for cheaper power from some consumers. 
Substantial problems loom over the current pricing
system. When the system is stressed and marginal cost
is high, small consumers do not face that high price so
they have little incentive to cut consumption and save
capacity costs. We are building expensive renewable
generation and will build much more under Ontario’s
Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009.
4Yet this
high long-run marginal cost is averaged in with low-
cost legacy hydroelectric power so it is invisible to
consumers. New nuclear plants will most likely cost
much more than the current system’s average cost, but
that cost will be blended with cheap Niagara power.
This is inefficient and unfair. If the marginal price was
higher, at all times, consumers would use less and some
capacity expansion would be avoided. 
Pricing Importance and Effect
The short-run price elasticity of residential demand for
electricity is generally around -0.3, (EPRI, 2008, p. 20)
meaning that a 10 percent increase in price will reduce
demand by 3 percent. Substantial demand reductions
imply unpopular price increases. Yet it is very difficult
3 The Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO), which is responsible for day-to-day operations of Ontario’s electricity system, posts hourly
prices on its website: http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/marketdata/marketToday.asp .
4 Bill 150, Royal Assent received May 14th, 2009.Backgrounder 124 | 5
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to reduce demand without increasing prices – many
consumers are not attentive to conservation if power is
cheap. Moreover, improving appliance efficiency
without raising electricity prices leads to a ‘rebound’
effect in which consumers use the appliances more
intensively, offsetting some or all of the expected
conservation (Sorrell, 2007, 2010). Years of experience
with conservation programs show that, without higher
prices, little is achieved (Jaccard, 2007, pp. 79-99).
Fortunately, the long-run elasticity after several years is
greater, perhaps as large as -0.9, because consumers
learn to adapt and to purchase more appropriate
appliances.
5We need to increase overall prices to
reduce baseload demand and the need for costly new
baseload generation. 
In addition, time-based pricing using smart meters
can encourage consumers to shift their consumption
from peak to off-peak periods.
6TOU pricing in which
the peak price is twice the off-peak price can reduce
peak demand by 3 percent to 6 percent (Faruqui and
Sergici, 2009, p. 36). An alternative is real-time pricing,
which can expose customers to short price peaks that
are many times the average price, reducing peak
demand by 10 percent (Spees and Lave, 2008). 
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) can achieve substantially
greater reductions in peak demand than TOU alone.
With CPP the customer pays a standard fixed price or
a TOU price most of the time but is exposed to a
critical peak price on a limited number of days per year
when generation reserves are low. When a reserve
problem is anticipated, the operator declares that the
next day will be a critical peak day and the price during
a specified critical peak period will be much higher
than usual (Wolak, 2006, OEB, 2007). (See Table 1.)
While many customers will not fiddle with their
consumption on a daily basis, they will make
adjustments on selected days to reduce peak
consumption substantially. A survey of CPP trials
found that TOU plus CPP with a critical peak price
about five times the usual price reduced peak
consumption among residential customers by 13
percent to 20 percent with an average of 17 percent
(Faruqui and Sergici, 2009, p. 43). Critical peak
reductions in Ontario pilot studies reached 25 percent
in summer (OEB, 2007, p. 37). Limiting the number
of critical peak days limits the resulting bill volatility.
While TOU is better than flat prices, TOU plus CPP
is better still.
Peak consumption can also be reduced by devices
that turn off major appliances such as air conditioners
or hot water heaters for a specified time during the
usual peak or that cycle them on and off to reduce
average consumption during that specified time.
7Even
providing consumers with real-time consumption
information can lead to reduced consumption.
8With
increasing sophistication of both control and
communication technology the potential for active
control of more appliances is growing. For these
control programs to be popular, however, the price of
electricity must be substantial and the peak price must
be high enough so that the customer expects significant
savings from this control. 
The Economics of Smart Meters,
Apartment and Condo Sub-metering
The capital, operating, communication and adminis-
tration costs for smart meters in single-family homes
generally add about $1/month compared to the cost of
the standard kWh meter.
9This additional amount is
much less than the customer electricity savings of over
$4/month found with TOU pricing in the Smart
Pricing Pilot conducted by the Ontario Energy Board,
the regulator (OEB 2007). Some of the electricity
savings represent electricity waste that the customer was
not aware of until the meter change but some repre-
sents a sacrifice of comfort or utility. As a result, the net
customer benefit may seem less than $4. However,
since electricity is under-priced by at least 50 percent at
peak times, the social savings from conservation and
peak reduction are valued at much more than $1/
month. The replacement of kWh meters with smart
meters for residential customers seems to be econo-
mically justified (see the Cost-Benefit box for details).
5 See EPRI (2008, p. 20) for a survey and synthesis of many empirical studies.
6 See, e.g., Mountain (2010), Faruqui and George (2005).
7 For example, the Toronto Hydro Peaksaver program reduces usage for up to four hours on weekday afternoons.
8 Mountain (2010.) Faruqui, Sergici and Sharif (2009) survey the literature and find savings from information devices ranging from 3 to 13 percent.
9 The OEB has approved additions of $1/month for Toronto Hydro, $1.15 for Ottawa Hydro, $0.93 for Hydro Networks, and $0.47 for Festival Hydro. 10 Statistics Canada, Income Statistics Division, Cansim, table 203-0019 and Catalogue no. 62F0026MIE.
11 Federation of Rental Housing Providers of Ontario testimony and Stratacon, Inc. testimony to the Ontario Standing Committee (2006); Toronto,
2008, p. 2.
12 The Oakville Pilot Study found reductions of 14 percent to 33 percent in overall kWh usage in three buildings from smart sub-metering. Park
Properties reported a 33 percent electricity reduction from smart sub-metering of 2,500 suites. New York State found reductions of 12 percent to
20 percent in overall kWh usage with simple sub-metering (NYSERDA, 2001).
13 The Oakville Pilot Study found a 10 percent reduction in peak electricity use from replacing bulk-metering with TOU.
14 The New York State study found net benefits to residents of $2 to $4 per month including reduced electricity costs. The Oakville Pilot and OEB
Smart Pricing Pilot suggest net savings of $3 to $6 per unit per month after deducting meter costs up to $1 per month.
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Multi-unit residential buildings that are bulk-metered
represent both a special opportunity and a challenge for
better pricing. Twenty-six percent of Ontario residents
live in multi-unit buildings
10 and between 75 to 90
percent of these buildings have bulk-metering
11 so
about 7 percent of Ontario’s electricity is bulk-metered.
Substantial reductions in overall consumption and in
peak consumption can be achieved by converting
multi-unit apartment and condominium buildings
from bulk-metering to sub-metering with individual
smart meters for each unit. Installing individual smart
meters with TOU pricing for each unit can reduce
total electricity consumption by 12 to 20 percent and
up to 30 percent in electrically heated buildings.
12 Peak
electricity use typically declines less than overall use,
often by around 10 percent.
13
However, the cost of installing sub-metering and the
savings that can be achieved depend on the design of
the building. At one extreme is a building with large
units, with electric heat, hot water, laundry appliances,
stove, and air conditioning in each unit and with
separate wiring for each unit. All of the energy used in
a unit can be captured by a sub-meter. Here the cost of
installing a sub-meter for each unit should be modest
and the opportunities for energy conservation and peak
reduction are substantial, so on average savings should
exceed costs.
14 Still some units, such as corner units
with extensive exterior exposure, may experience higher
costs than with bulk-metering.
At the other extreme is a building with central
heating and air conditioning, central hot water,
communal laundry facilities and small units. Here the
opportunities for energy conservation and peak
reduction that can be induced by sub-metering are
limited to careful use of lighting and appliances such
as the stove and home entertainment systems. The
benefits of sub-metering are small. If the building has
electric heating wired collectively for several adjacent
small units, sub-metering would require expensive re-
wiring, which would likely be uneconomic. Even
with electric heat, in a rental building the landlord
determines the exterior insulation so the tenant has
little control over heating and cooling costs.
One problem is that the cost of managing customer
accounts and bills for each unit, rather than for the
building as a whole, appears substantial. While studies
of sub-metering suggest that the energy cost reductions
arising from conservation behaviour greatly exceed the
| 6 Backgrounder 124
In the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) Smart Price
pilot involving single-family homes, the average
monthly consumption was 775 kWh prior to
implementation and 727 afterwards.  On average, 
23 percent was consumed during peak hours and, 
if peak conservation is proportional to total
conservation, that would represent a monthly
demand reduction during peak hours of 10kWh. If
the true cost of peak power is at least 10 cents/kWh,
$1 would be saved in generation costs.  The lost
consumer satisfaction would be roughly the change
in quantity multiplied by the average between the
flat price (5.7 cents) and the TOU price (10 cents),
or 7.85 cents, leaving a net gain of $0.22 ($1 minus
78.5 cents).  In the off-peak period, the price would
be less than 5.7 cents, the consumer would use more
electricity and would have more satisfaction and less
cost, adding to the net gain from TOU pricing. 
This confirms that not only has the customer saved
money, but is also better off after accounting for
losses and gains in satisfaction. 
Box: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Single-Family TOU Pricing.cost of installing and maintaining the meters, those
studies ignore the fixed customer charge imposed by
distribution utilities. Toronto Hydro’s fixed customer
charge is about $17/month
15 while competitive meter
service providers generally charge between $10 and
$20.
16 Such charges exceed the average sub-metering
savings from reduced consumption found in most
studies. If these charges truly reflect the cost of serving
one more customer by a local distributor or a sub-
metering company then sub-metering appears
uneconomic. Under-pricing of electricity makes it hard
to assess sub-metering, but if we double the price of
peak electricity to reflect pollution and high capacity
costs the net customer benefits may still be negative.
The cost of metering, billing and servicing an account
would have to be well under $10/month to make sub-
metering economic in many buildings. 
Policymakers must determine in which types of
buildings the benefits are most likely to exceed the
costs, considering the true value of electricity. The
2006 Residential Tenancies Act
17 proposed to allow
landlords to unilaterally install sub-meters but required
them to reduce rents to compensate for the
elimination of ‘free’ hydro. Landlords were concerned
about the required rent reduction, especially if they
had to compensate tenants for the new monthly
customer charges. To ensure that all costs are weighed
by the landlord and to avoid uneconomic sub-
metering, sub-metering should remain at the
discretion of the building owner and landlords should
be required to reduce rents in the amount of past
electricity costs plus the monthly customer charges
that tenants will have to pay to the electricity
distributor. A recent Ontario Energy Board decision
(OEB, 2009b) illustrates the difficulty of making this
work in practice, so more rules may be required.
In Ontario, legal barriers in the past made it difficult
to sub-meter existing condo buildings. Condominium
buildings were required to amend their “declaration”
(essentially a constitution), which required 80 percent
owner approval, an impossibly high barrier.
18 Recent
regulations have eliminated the requirement to amend
the “declaration” facilitating sub-metering when the
condominium board wants to proceed. 
Smart meters and TOU pricing benefit those whose
load is concentrated in the off-peak and those who can
reduce their peak consumption. On the other hand, it
will raise costs for those who consume more during
the peak and who cannot or will not respond. It has
been suggested that many small businesses cannot cut
their peak consumption – the restaurant has to cook
meals when people want to eat and stores cannot turn
off the lights during the afternoon peak (Andrew,
2009). An Ontario study found that residents of
seniors’ housing and affordable housing responded
very little to peak pricing and thus found their bills
unchanged or increased with TOU pricing (Simmons
and Rowlands, 2007). While some individuals and
groups may not respond in the short run to TOU
pricing, it is plausible that over a longer time period
technology and methods of response could be
developed that would assist these groups to reduce
their costs. In the short run, there will be losers from
any change in pricing. However, abandoning TOU
pricing to avoid imposing costs on these groups
throws out the baby with the bathwater. We should
instead look for compensation outside the electricity
system for groups whose bills would rise substantially
from the proposed pricing, who are proven to be
unable to respond and who deserve public support. 
Where Do We Go From Here?
Ontario’s plan to apply TOU pricing to 3.6 million
customers in Ontario by June 2011 was followed by a
Toronto Hydro announcement that most single-
family Toronto households would be on TOU by
mid-2010.
19This is a good start. I recommend going
a few steps further.
Backgrounder 124 | 7
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15 Toronto Hydro, Draft Rate Order (April, 2009). Schedule 7, Tariff of Rates and Charges.
16 For example, Stratacon quotes a monthly administrative charge of $11 per unit for one sub-metering installation. Stratacon, 2009, “Sub-metering
– the Masaryktown Experience,” http://www.stratacon.ca/node/138. The Enbridge fixed charge is $12.55/month.
http://www.enbridgeelectric.com/EEC/BillComponents.aspx .
17 Bill 109, Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, section 137. 
18 If 25 percent of the owners used much more electricity than the average they would have a strong incentive to vote against the amendment rather
than pay for their actual usage.
19 Toronto Star, 14 May, 2009, “Toronto set for time-of-day use power pricing.”20 Voluntary TOU programs generally yield low participation rates (Faruqui and George, 2005). Even the very successful Ottawa Hydro pilot only
attracted 30 percent participation. Fortunately, a majority of the Ottawa participants liked the program and said they would recommend it to their
friends (OEB, 2007, p. 54).
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First, time-of-use pricing should be the default or
standard regulated service for all customers with a
smart meter. Success will not come from voluntary
TOU programs that will be rejected by those we most
want involved – those with peak loads coinciding with
the system peak.
20The Minister’s announcement was
not clear that TOU pricing would be mandatory. It
must be mandatory to gain maximum effect. In multi-
unit residential buildings smart sub-metering should
be voluntary except where it is clear that the likely
benefits justify the costs. The TOU rates can also
incorporate an increasing block price to limit increases
in the overall cost of electricity for small users.
Second, critical peak pricing (CPP) should be
added to TOU pricing as the regulated standard
service. TOU plus CPP is much more effective than
TOU alone (OEB, 2007, p. 37). Greatly increasing
the price on a small number of critical peak days
would further reduce peak demand on days when
demand threatens to exceed supply. This would give
every consumer an incentive to reduce peak demand
vigorously on critical days, saving capacity expansion
costs. Because most generation, transmission and
distribution in Canada is still government-owned, we
have more flexibility to adopt such a sophisticated
standard supply than most US states with investor-
owned utilities. If the administration of CPP requires
time-consuming changes to meter data systems
and/or billing systems as suggested by Ontario
Energy Board (OEB) staff, this could be postponed to
allow those changes, but it should be clear that CPP is
to be a central part of the new standard pricing
system. This is consistent with the recommendation
of the OEB staff (OEB, 2008, p. 15). Furthermore,
customers who prefer real-time pricing, paying the
spot price every hour, should have that option.
Third, the price for all consumers should be
increased to include the costs of environmental
damage. This could be achieved by using a cap-and-
trade system to control air pollution and either a
similar system or a carbon tax for greenhouse gas
emissions. The price of carbon dioxide emissions must
be substantial, reflecting the urgency of the problem.
This would force generators to include the price of
allowances or the carbon tax in their bids, thus building
it into the time-varying Ontario market price.
However, the emissions trading must be applied to all
sectors of the economy to avoid creating incentives to
shift from using electricity that embodies the price of
pollution to burning fossil fuels directly. Until these
systems come into play, a TOU system with high peak
prices can limit the demand for electricity when
polluting fossil units are most likely to operate.
The price should also reflect long-run marginal
costs, the cost of new generation units. If new
generators are paid more than 10 cents, consumers
should pay more than 10 cents for peak
consumption. Since peak-period demand determines
system capacity, peak users should pay the full costs of
peaking capacity. This argues for further increases in
the peak and mid-peak prices in the TOU system.
The May 2009 TOU prices (Table 1) have a peak
price only 2.16 times the off-peak price. The OEB’s
2009 revision to its pricing manual shifts more costs
to peak periods but not necessarily enough. At the
same time, off-peak demand will contribute to the
need for new baseload generation so off-peak prices
should reflect the cost of this generation. 
As we move to time-varying pricing for all
consumers of regulated supply, we should also help
them to control their usage. Appliance control
programs offered by the local distribution utility
would be a first step. Providing consumers with
information about their consumption helps them to
control that consumption. Provincial ministries
should actively promote such programs. However,
these programs are supplements, not substitutes for
realistic pricing.
Finally, the public needs to understand why we are
changing prices. Ontario’s competitive market failed
politically in 2002 in part because the public was
poorly informed about what was happening and
why. If we want to improve retail pricing in Canada,
we need an effective public information program. If
we want to adopt prices that reflect environmental
harm, expensive new capacity and peak costs, we
must explain to consumers why this is good for all of
us. Selling this message is perhaps the greatest
challenge to efficient electricity pricing.Backgrounder 124 | 9
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